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I. INTRODUCTION 
Estate sales frequently boast a variety of goods collected over 
decedents’ lifetimes: furniture, jewelry, tableware, even old comic 
books or vinyl records. All of these goods—even those subject to 
copyright protection—can be resold without further compensating 
the copyright holder or original author. If the decedent had 
chosen, she also could have sold, lent, or given away those items 
during her lifetime, or bequeathed them in her will. 
But what if, rather than vintage comic books or records, the 
decedent had instead spent thousands of dollars purchasing digital 
goods: audio files downloaded from Apple or Google, or e-books 
from Amazon? 
The first-sale doctrine—which allows those who own physical 
copies of songs, books, and movies to transfer that ownership to 
someone else—has no direct counterpart in the digital realm 
(i.e., downloaded works). As society’s digital appetite continues to 
increase, society may want to consider how those purchases are 
treated: as “ownership” or as a “lifetime lease.” 
This article discusses the history of the first-sale doctrine,1 
examines the potential for a digital first-sale doctrine,2 and discusses 
how such a digital first-sale doctrine might be established through 
legislation, the courts, or the marketplace.3 Lastly, this article posits 
that content licenses and subscription services may render any 
establishment of a digital first-sale doctrine unnecessary.4 
II. HISTORY OF THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE 
A. The First-Sale Doctrine’s Establishment 
Copyright in the United States traces its origins to the 
Constitution, which grants to Congress the authority to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”5 The first copyright statute, 
enacted in 1790, permitted copyright protection to authors of any 
 
 1.  See infra Part II. 
 2.  See infra Part III, IV. 
 3.  See infra Part V. 
 4.  See infra Part VI. 
 5.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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2014] CONTEMPLATING DIGITAL FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE 785 
“map, chart, [or] book.”6 That early copyright statute, however, did 
not fully address the question of what rights a copyright holder had 
to restrict sales—beyond the work’s “first” sale. By the early 1900s, 
patent holders had begun restricting future uses of their devices via 
licenses,7 and copyright holders sought to assert similar rights. But 
where the patent holders succeeded, the copyright owners 
ultimately failed. 
In its 1908 decision Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,8 the Supreme 
Court conclusively established the first-sale doctrine. In that case, 
the copyright holder sought to enforce a minimum retail price for 
books that it printed and sold at wholesale. To further that goal, it 
printed—above the copyright notice—a purported license 
requiring that the minimum retail price be $1.9 The defendant 
bookseller obtained the books through a third party, and knowing 
of the purported license, it chose to sell each book for $0.89.10 The 
Supreme Court ruled that after the initial sale—the “first sale”—
copyright holders did not retain any exclusive right to “vend” the 
copyrighted work.11 
Congress codified this ruling—and the first-sale doctrine—in 
the 1909 Copyright Act,12 creating § 109, which now reads in 
relevant part: “[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, . . . is entitled, without the authority 
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the 
possession of that copy or phonorecord.”13 Congress’s purpose was 
to allow the exclusive distribution right to be exhausted after the 
copyright owner has received the appropriate compensation for 
 
 6.  Copyright Act of 1790, ch.15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). 
 7.  See, e.g., Am. Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 94–95 (1882) 
(finding that patent holders could enforce a license (printed on the device) that 
restricted it to one use; a party who obtained, repaired, and reused those devices 
effectively infringed the patent-holder’s rights). 
 8.  210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 342. 
 11.  See id. at 350 (“[T]he copyright statutes . . . do not create the right to 
impose, by notice, . . . a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by 
future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract.”). 
 12.  17 U.S.C. § 41 (1909) (“[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, 
prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of 
which has been lawfully obtained.”). 
 13.  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
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each copy of the work.14 The 1976 Copyright Act incorporated 
§ 109 with little change.15 
The idea that a copy’s rightful owner has the right to freely 
transfer it has come to be known as the first-sale doctrine.16 That 
doctrine has been in flux: both expanding and contracting over 
time.17 
B. The First-Sale Doctrine’s Expansion 
Expansion of the first-sale doctrine has come via both courts 
and statutes. One line of cases expanded the first-sale doctrine by 
limiting copyright owners’ exclusive right to distribute.18 These so-
called “lawfully made” cases involved defendants who legally 
purchased copyrighted works abroad, reimporting them for sale 
without the copyright holders’ permission. In these cases, the 
Supreme Court progressively expanded the interpretation of the 
“lawfully made under this title” clause in § 109 to include first 
goods made in the United States,19 and then any good produced 
abroad20 with the copyright holder’s permission. 
 
 14.  See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 8.12[A] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013) (arguing that the exclusive distribution 
right exists primarily to protect copyright owners against the distribution of the 
owner’s own copies that have been “stolen or otherwise wrongfully obtained,” and 
this protection is unnecessary “where the copyright owner first consents to the sale 
or other distribution of copies . . . of his work”). 
 15.  See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976), (“Section 109(a) restates and 
confirms the principle that, where the copyright owner has transferred ownership 
of a particular copy or phonorecord of a work, the person to whom the copy or 
phonorecord is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by sale, rental, or any other 
means.”), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5693. 
 16.  2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.12[B][1]. 
 17.  For example, the software industry has become more aggressive in 
structuring its transactions with customers as “licenses” or “leases” to avoid selling 
a copy and relinquishing control over the distribution right. See, e.g., Vernor v. 
Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a third-party 
eBay seller had no right to resell software purchased from an Autodesk customer 
because the initial transaction was a “license” and not a sale). 
 18.  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013); 
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 144 (1998). 
 19.  Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 154 (finding that an importer of 
hair care products bearing copyrighted labels obtained overseas was eligible for 
the first-sale defense). The Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the exclusive 
right to distribute under § 106(3) “is a limited right” and that one of the 
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Beyond the courts, Congress has also taken steps to expand 
the first-sale doctrine. For example, after the Fourth Circuit held 
that an arcade that allowed customers to play imported video 
games from Japan violated the copyright holder’s exclusive right to 
“publicly perform” the work as embodied in the video games’ 
circuit boards,21 Congress passed the Computer Software Rental 
Amendments Act of 1990.22 That legislation amended § 109 to 
allow for the public performance of video game circuit boards 
without the copyright holder’s permission after a first sale.23 
C. The First-Sale Doctrine’s Contraction 
Since Bobbs-Merrill, the first-sale doctrine has also been 
contracted. For example, the Record Rental Amendment Act of 
198424 limited the first-sale doctrine’s reach for sound recordings. 
The act amended § 109(b) to prohibit the “rental, lease, or 
lending” of sound recordings, even after a first sale.25 This 
amendment targeted stores that were renting sound recordings as 
well as selling blank cassette tapes, all while promising customers 
that they would “[n]ever, ever buy another record.”26 Because 
copying a sound recording was relatively easy—even if possession 
was only temporary—Congress acted to protect the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right of reproduction by expanding the exclusive 
right of distribution and restricting the first-sale doctrine.27 Six 
years later, the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 
1990 extended this concept to software.28 The legislative history 
shows that Congress sought to curtail what was purported to be 
 
limitations is the terms of § 109(a). Id. at 144. 
 20.  Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1358. 
 21.  Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 281 (4th Cir. 
1989) (holding that the first-sale doctrine applies only to distribution, not 
performance). 
 22.  Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 802–803, 104 Stat. 5134 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(b), (e) (2012)). 
 23.  Id. § 803, 104 Stat. at 5135. 
 24.  Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109). 
 25.  Id. § 2, 98 Stat. at 1727. 
 26.  H.R. REP. NO. 98-987, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2898, 
2899. 
 27.  Id. at 1–2, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2898–99. 
 28.  See Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 803, 104 Stat. at 5135 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109(e)). 
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over $1 billion in losses attributed to software piracy.29 Courts have 
read these provisions favorably, interpreting them beyond their 
stated purposes, and they sometimes find rental arrangements 
disguised as deferred-payment plans.30 
Congress has also limited the first-sale doctrine’s scope to 
harmonize with international treaties. To protect a work under the 
1976 Copyright Act, an author had to both register his work and 
provide a copyright notice.31 If a work was published in the United 
States before complying with these formalities, that publication 
destroyed any potential copyright protection. These formalities 
were unique to the United States, and they ran afoul of the Berne 
Convention’s requirements for granting copyright protection.32 As 
such, many works created abroad and published by unsophisticated 
authors fell into the American public domain.33 The United States 
 
 29.  S. REP. NO. 101-265, at 3 (1990).  
 30.  See Cent. Point Software, Inc. v. Global Software & Accessories, Inc., 880 
F. Supp. 957, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that a business offering software for 
sale at a low price, with a higher deferred payment only due if customer failed to 
return the software in five days “operates as a ‘practice in the nature of rental’ 
under the Act, and, therefore, is prohibited”); see also Adobe Sys., Inc. v. 
Brenengen, 928 F. Supp. 616, 618 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding that software rental 
business that began before the effective date of the 1990 amendment was not 
“grandfathered in” and was enjoined from engaging in the rental of software 
obtained after 1990). 
 31.  2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 7.01[A] (“[T]he failure to affix a 
copyright notice in proper form and in the proper place on published copies or 
phonorecords of a work could prove fatal to copyright in the work.”). 
 32.  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. No 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (last amended 
Sept. 28, 1979) [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“The enjoyment and the exercise 
of these rights shall not be subject to any formality.”). The Berne Convention, 
originally signed by ten nations in 1886, is a multilateral agreement to protect 
copyright across national boundaries. 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01[B][1] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013). The 
current text of the Berne Convention is the Paris Act, adopted in 1974. Id. 
§ 17.01[B][1][a]. The original signatories of the Berne Convention were 
Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Haiti, Italy, Switzerland, 
Tunisia, and Liberia. Id. § 17.01[B][1][a] n.10. 
 33.  5 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 32, § 17.01[C][2][b] (citing Hasbro 
Bradley, Inc. v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 780 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1985)) (“[T]o cite an 
extreme example, in order to enjoy United States copyright protection, a toy 
published by a Japanese company in Japan had to bear a copyright notice 
complying with Title 17, United States Code, notwithstanding that Japan requires 
no copyright notice to secure protection for its works and that, in any event, toys 
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did not accede to the Berne Convention until 1989,34 and it was not 
until after the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs)35 that Congress acted to protect these 
foreign works.36 
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)37 granted 
copyright protection to works that were protected in their countries 
of origin but not in the United States.38 The URAA also created an 
exception to the first-sale doctrine by amending § 109 to prevent 
selling or transferring copies of works that were newly removed 
from the public domain.39 In 2012, the Supreme Court upheld this 
 
are not copyrightable works in Japan.”). 
 34.  See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 
§ 2(3), 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 [hereinafter BCIA] (“The amendments made by this 
Act, together with the law as it exists on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne Convention 
and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that 
purpose.”).  
 35.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. 
 36.  The BCIA explicitly did not handle the question of foreign works that 
had fallen into the American public domain due to a failure to follow the 
necessary formalities. H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 51 (1988) (“The question of 
whether and, if so, how Congress might provide retroactive protection to works 
now in our public domain raises difficult questions, possibly with constitutional 
dimensions. These questions do not have to be addressed now and can be raised if 
and when presented in the context of specific facts.”). 
 37.  Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976–81 (1994) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2012)) (implementing TRIPs). 
 38.  The bill’s intent was to “restore copyright protection to certain foreign 
works from countries that are members of the Berne Convention or WTO that 
have fallen into the public domain for reasons other than the normal expiration 
of their term of protection.” S. REP. NO. 103-412, at 225 (1994); see also 17 U.S.C. 
§ 104A(a)(1)(B) (“Any work in which copyright is restored under this section shall 
subsist for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have 
otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered the public 
domain in the United States.”). 
 39.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, copies 
or phonorecords of works subject to restored copyright under section 104A that 
are manufactured before the date of restoration of copyright or, with respect to 
reliance parties, before publication or service of notice under section 104A(e), 
may be sold or otherwise disposed of without the authorization of the owner of the 
restored copyright for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage only 
during the 12-month period . . . .”). 
7
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claw back from the public domain—and limitation of the first-sale 
doctrine.40 
The first-sale doctrine has also seen contraction through the 
courts. Timothy Vernor was an eBay seller who resold copies of 
Autodesk’s software, AutoCAD Release 14.41 The publisher 
provided this expensive software package to the original users via a 
limited license, which reserved title to Autodesk and restricted the 
purchaser’s rights to transfer or sell the software.42 The Ninth 
Circuit held that although the original purchasers paid for and 
received physical copies of the software, they were not the “owners” 
of the copies under § 109, so the first-sale doctrine did not permit 
Mr. Vernor to resell them again.43 The Vernor court looked at three 
factors: (1) ”whether the copyright owner specifies that a user is 
granted a license,” (2) ”whether the copyright owner significantly 
restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software,” and 
(3) ”whether the copyright owner imposes notable use 
restrictions.”44 Since software and other digital products are 
increasingly sold with restrictive license terms, the secondary 
market is limited. 
Other courts have taken contrasting approaches to the 
question of “ownership.” The Second Circuit, in determining 
whether someone possessing a copy of computer software was an 
owner under § 117(a),45 held that multiple factors determine 
ownership; formal title is just one.46 In contrast, the Court of Justice 
 
 40.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884 (2012) (holding that Congress 
indeed had the power to pull works that had been in the U.S. public domain back 
under copyright protection, when this protection was required in order to satisfy 
American obligations under the Berne Convention). 
 41.  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 1103–04. 
 44.  Id. at 1110–11. 
 45.  17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012) (stating that “it is not an infringement for the 
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of 
another copy or adaptation of that computer program,” provided that the making 
of the copy is an essential step in using the software or the copy is made for 
archival purposes). 
 46.  Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We conclude 
for these reasons that formal title in a program copy is not an absolute 
prerequisite to qualifying for § 117(a)’s affirmative defense. Instead, courts should 
inquire into whether the party exercises sufficient incidents of ownership over a 
copy of the program to be sensibly considered the owner of the copy for purposes 
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of the European Union (“EU Court of Justice”) looked beyond the 
four corners of the license between the copyright holder and the 
original purchaser, inferring that the transaction was an actual 
sale.47 In that case, the EU Court of Justice held that the sale 
constituted an exhaustion of the copyright holder’s distribution 
right.48 To find the sale, the EU Court of Justice looked at the terms 
of the original transaction: a one-time fee to use the software for an 
unlimited period.49 The EU Court of Justice contrasted those terms 
of sale with terms of a mere rental, holding that the copyright 
owner’s distribution right had been exhausted.50 
III. PURE DIGITAL CONTENT MAY BE DIFFERENT 
The transfer from analog content to digital content is more 
than just a shift in delivery mechanisms. In the analog world of 
Bobbs-Merrill, after a copyrighted work’s initial sale, publishers’ 
concerns were limited. Unauthorized copying could occur, but the 
Copyright Act expressly prohibited it; further, those publishers 
could track and stop large-scale operations of mass copying.51 Even 
after the first-sale doctrine’s establishment, publishers had little to 
fear from a secondary market that was tempered by physical goods’ 
scarcity and degradation. Used book purchases are only possible 
 
of § 117(a). The presence or absence of formal title may of course be a factor in 
this inquiry, but the absence of formal title may be outweighed by evidence that 
the possessor of the copy enjoys sufficiently broad rights over it to be sensibly 
considered its owner.”); see also DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc’ns, Inc., 
170 F.3d 1354, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] party who purchases copies of 
software from the copyright owner can hold a license under a copyright while still 
being an ‘owner’ of a copy of the copyrighted software for purposes of section 
117.”). 
 47.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 EUR- 
Lex 62011CJ0128 (July 3, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex= 
62011CJ0128&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=. 
 48.  Id. ¶ 72. 
 49.  Id. ¶ 59. 
 50.  Id. ¶ 88 (holding the copyright holder may retain distribution rights 
where the software could only be used for a limited period of time). 
 51.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 20 (2001) 
[hereinafter DMCA REPORT], available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports 
/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf (mentioning that the Bobbs-Merrill court 
“noted, as a matter of statutory construction, that the reproduction right was the 
‘main purpose’ of the copyright law, and the right to vend existed to give effect to 
the reproduction right”). 
9
Riehl and Kassim: Is Buying Digital Content Just Renting for Life: Contemplating a
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
792 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2 
because someone originally purchased the book, so the number of 
copies are limited by the extent of the publisher’s primary sales. 
Further, all physical books eventually degrade through use or time. 
In addition, the burden of physically transporting books can create 
a barrier to secondary sales. Therefore, consumers often have an 
incentive to obtain a new copy of a physical good, even if they must 
pay a premium. 
In contrast, digital content publishers release their goods into 
a stream of commerce that is far more risky: making copies 
(legitimate or otherwise) and instantaneously transporting them 
anywhere in the world is trivially easy.52 Such infinite reproducibility 
creates a number of problems for publishers. Foremost among 
these is piracy: the unauthorized copying and distribution of purely 
digital goods—or physical goods (e.g., CDs, DVDs) that can be 
converted into a digital format. Piracy is an existential threat to the 
media and software industries, and copyright holders have taken a 
number of approaches to combat it: from public awareness 
campaigns,53 to legal action,54 to legislative changes,55 to technical 
solutions such as digital rights management (DRM).56 
 
 52.  Id. at 82. 
 53.  See Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Rights Coordination Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Antipiracy PSA (Update), YOUTUBE (June 9, 2011), http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=6YScoXn31Mg; Report Software Piracy Now!, BSA: 
SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, https://reporting.bsa.org/r/report/add.aspx?src=us&ln=en 
-us (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). For a news release on the launch of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security YouTube video campaign, see News Release, 
U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, New Public Service Announcement 
Launched to Raise Intellectual Property Theft Awareness, (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1104/110426washingtondc.htm. 
 54.  See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) 
(holding that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties”); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that a file-sharing service could be held liable for indirect 
infringement of plaintiff’s copyrights when it knew of specific infringing material 
being transferred and did not exercise its power to block it). 
 55.  See, e.g., Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-650, § 802, 104 Stat. 5134, 5134–35 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012)); 
Record Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, § 2, 98 Stat. 1727, 1727 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109). 
 56.  See infra Part IV. 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/10
 
2014] CONTEMPLATING DIGITAL FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE 793 
Even if piracy were not an issue, expanding the first-sale 
doctrine to cover digital goods is problematic. Part of the problem 
lies in the policy reasons behind the first-sale doctrine’s 
development. When considering whether to apply the first-sale 
doctrine to digital goods, the U.S. Copyright Office explained that 
the doctrine began as “an outgrowth of the distinction between 
ownership of intangible intellectual property (the copyright) and 
ownership of tangible personal property (the copy).”57 The first-sale 
doctrine arises out of a desire to avoid restraining the owner of the 
tangible property from alienating it as he or she chooses.58 As such, 
the doctrine limits the copyright holder’s exclusive right of 
distribution. But when digital goods are transferred or used, it 
results in a new copy—which may implicate the owner’s exclusive 
right of reproduction.59 The first-sale doctrine, in contrast, is silent as 
to reproduction. When considering the viability of a potential 
digital first-sale doctrine, that distinction is significant. 
In addition to the legal issue, permitting sales of digital 
content would also likely affect the marketplace. For example, a 
secondary market for digital goods would likely depress prices for 
new sales. Unlike relatively fragile physical works—such as a 
scratched CD or a dog-eared and highlighted textbook—used 
digital goods and their new counterparts are indistinguishable. As 
such, copyright owners worried about digital first sale might ask: 
“Why would anyone buy a new copy?”60 For example, the first 
purchaser might buy an e-book for $10. Then that purchaser might 
sell it to another for $9. After several iterations and some time, the 
price may well shrink to $0.01. To the new purchaser, that one cent 
copy and the ten dollar copy would be identical. So what consumer 
would want to be the first to pay a $10 premium when a patient 
consumer could pay only $0.01 for an identical copy?61 
 
 57.  DMCA REPORT, supra note 51, at 86. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  This might be true even if, as in ReDigi, the technology deletes the 
original copy during the new copy’s creation. See infra notes 93−97 and 
accompanying text.  
 60.  See David Pogue, Reselling E-Books and the One-Penny Problem, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 14, 2013, 3:11 PM), http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/reselling 
-e-books-and-the-one-penny-problem. 
 61.  See id. 
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This concern might elicit two responses. First, a digital 
secondary market may still contain scarcity. Although some 
consumers will wait, seeking a discount, some consumers will always 
be willing to pay full price in order to obtain media around its 
release date. Presuming that copyrighted content cannot be freely 
copied,62 sales to primary purchasers will define the secondary 
market’s scope. If few (or no) primary purchasers buy the work, 
then that scarcity would limit the secondary market. This scenario 
could result in content owners charging primary purchasers with a 
high premium—essentially a tax for being first. 
This arrangement currently exists, to some degree, in the high-
end “AAA” video-game market. Producing AAA games is expensive. 
Some titles’ production costs are in the tens of millions of dollars.63 
Sold new, each game’s retail cost is more than sixty dollars. But 
within the first few weeks of a new title’s release, video game 
resellers frequently permit those primary purchasers to return 
those new titles for significant in-store credits.64 Under this 
arrangement, the “early bird” consumers know that although they 
may spend more initially, they will be able to recoup some of that 
expenditure upon trade-in. As such, the video-game industry’s 
healthy secondary market presumably supports—at least in part—
the launch date’s premium prices. 
Second, copyright owners have almost always had concerns 
about secondary markets, but their worst worries have largely failed 
to materialize. From the turn of the twentieth century and beyond, 
book publishers have been concerned about the used book 
market’s effect on new book profits.65 And near the end of the 
 
 62.  This presumption is, of course, largely academic. 
 63.  Colin Campbell, Are AAA Hardcore Games Doomed? An In-depth Look 
at the Future of Big-Budget, Blockbuster Video Games, IGN (July 30, 2012), http://www 
.ign.com/articles/2012/07/30/are-aaa-hardcore-games-doomed (noting that the 
budget for Rockstar Games’ 2012 release Max Payne 3 was estimated to be over 
$100 million). 
 64.  For example, at the time of this writing, the first-person shooter game 
The Last of Us was being offered as new for $59.99, The Last of Us for 
Playstation 3, GAMESTOP, http://www.gamestop.com/ps3/games/the-last-of 
-us/98630 (last visited Nov. 25, 2013), while the same retailer was offering $32.50 
for that title as a trade-in. For a list of the current trade value for select games, see 
Featured Trade Values, GAMESTOP, http://www.gamestop.com/trade-values (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2013). 
 65.  The “net price” printed on the copies of The Castaway at issue in Bobbs-
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twentieth century, one of the biggest-selling musicians in history, 
Garth Brooks, used his clout in an attempt to curb used CD sales.66 
State statutes have also flirted with the idea of curbing sales of used 
CDs and DVDs.67 But even with robust secondary markets, both the 
publishing and music industries survived and thrived—reaping 
billions in revenue.68 Much of this success can be attributed to an 
increase in the sales of digital goods. In 2011 the music industry 
reported revenues of $5.2 billion in worldwide digital sales alone.69 
Similarly, the publishing industry has reported e-book revenues of 
over $3 billion.70 Concerns about a potential digital first-sale 
doctrine might be overblown—unless, of course, this time really is 
different. 
IV. THE RISE AND WEAKNESSES OF DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 
If the digital first-sale doctrine were to become a reality, 
copyright holders may well seek the protection of technological 
measures. For example, copyright holders facing the digital 
 
Merrill was part of the American Publishers’ Association’s plan to “correct evils 
connected with the cutting of prices on copyright books.” Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. 
Straus, 139 F. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1905).  
 66.  Michael A. Barber, He’s True to the Issue and Fans Are True to Him, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 4, 1993, at C1, available at 1993 WLNR 1529281. 
 67.  For example, Florida’s Secondhand Articles and Dealers Statute requires 
dealers of used goods to record detailed transaction information, including 
thumbprints, from individuals bringing in said goods for sale. FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 538.04(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg. Sess.). In 2006, it was 
amended to include a broad range of copyrightable goods including used CDs and 
DVDs in the definition of “secondhand goods.” Act of June 13, 2006, ch. 2006-201, 
§ 1, 2006 Fla. Laws 2190, 2191–92 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 538.03(f)). 
 68.  Despite drops through much of the 21st century, the music industry 
reported revenue of $16.5 billion in 2012. Eric Pfanner, Music Industry Sales Rise, 
and Digital Revenue Gets the Credit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at B3, available at 2013 
WLNR 4882671. Book sales brought in $27.12 billion in 2012. Jim Milliot, 
Trade Sales Rose 6.9% in 2012, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (May 15, 2013), http:// 
www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/financial-reporting/article 
/57242-trade-sales-rose-6-9-in-2012.html. 
 69.  INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2012, at 
6–7 (2012), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2012.pdf. 
 70.  Laura Hazard Owen, PwC: The U.S. Consumer Ebook Market Will Be Bigger 
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content challenges have previously employed technological 
solutions in attempts to replicate some of physical media’s 
limitations. The technological category that controls access and use 
of digital goods is known generally as digital rights management 
(DRM).71 Content owners have employed DRM for many purposes, 
including preventing unauthorized copying,72 restricting access 
based on the playback-device manufacturer,73 or restricting by 
geographic region.74 Like all technologies, DRM schemes are 
vulnerable to attack by persons and groups who are motivated to 
circumvent them. This has led to a cat-and-mouse scenario in which 
copyright holders constantly strive to develop newer DRM 
technologies that can temporarily delay their nearly inevitable 
cracking.75 
Because of DRM’s technical vulnerabilities, copyright owners 
must couple their DRM with legal enforcement that will legally 
prevent consumers from using widely available DRM-circumvention 
tools. In the United States, copyright holders obtained this legal 
 
 71.  Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538–39 (2005) (noting that DRM “simulate[s] 
the natural appropriability resistance of physical goods,” when DRM controls 
“prohibit or constrain the copying and distribution that digital formats invite . . . 
essentially transforming public goods back into private goods”). 
 72.  See, e.g., United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1118 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (“For example, [using the Adobe Content Server software] the ebook 
publisher may choose whether the consumer will be able to copy the ebook, 
whether the ebook can be printed to paper (in whole, in part, or not at all), 
whether the ‘lending function’ is enabled to allow the user to lend the ebook to 
another computer on the same network of computers, and whether to permit the 
ebook to be read audibly by a speech synthesizer program.”). 
 73.  See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 
303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“CSS-protected motion pictures on DVDs may be viewed only 
on players and computer drives equipped with licensed technology that permits 
the devices to decrypt and play—but not to copy—the films.”), aff’d sub nom. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 74.  Burk, supra note 71, at 562 (“Machines manufactured in different 
geographic areas were designed to allow access to the content of a given DVD only 
if the disc was coded to be played in that corresponding geographic area, thus 
allowing significant control over the timing and distribution of movies released in 
different parts of the globe.”). 
 75.  Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 343 (“Defendants are in the business of 
disseminating information to assist hackers in ‘cracking’ various types of 
technological security systems. . . . In consequence, the Court finds that there is a 
substantial likelihood of future violations absent injunctive relief.”). 
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enforcement mechanism under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA).76 The DMCA implements77 the World Intellectual 
Property Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Treaty”), article 
11 of which states: 
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal 
protection and effective legal remedies against the 
circumvention of effective technological measures that 
are used by authors in connection with the exercise of 
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention 
and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are 
not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by 
law.78 
The DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision, codified in the 
Copyright Act,79 distinguishes technological controls preventing 
unauthorized access and those preventing unauthorized uses (i.e., 
those implicating copyright holders’ exclusive rights under § 106). 
To accommodate fair use and other exemptions to copyright 
infringement, the DMCA seeks to prevent only circumvention of 
those measures designed to prevent access.80 Specifically, § 1201(a) 
states that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure 
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this 
title.”81 But § 1201(b) still prohibits creating or distributing devices 
that are primarily designed to allow circumventing copy-control 
schemes that protect rights under § 106.82 In practice, however, 
access-control and copy-control measures are effectively identical.83 
 
 76.  Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 77.  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998). 
 78.  World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 
20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121. 
 79.  17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). 
 80.  DMCA REPORT, supra note 51, at 11. 
 81.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 82.  Id. § 1201(b)(1) (“No person shall manufacture . . . or otherwise traffic 
in any technology . . . that is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of 
circumventing protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively 
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title . . . .”). 
 83.  Burk, supra note 71, at 559 (citing 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer 
Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (classifying CSS as “a 
technological measure that both effectively controls access to DVDs and effectively 
protects the right of a copyright holder”)). 
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This—coupled with the few exceptions permitting research,84 
archival,85 and fair-use86 circumventions—has prompted some 
commentators to argue that the DMCA goes far beyond anything 
required by the WIPO Treaty’s anti-circumvention provisions.87 
Shielded by the DMCA, copyright holders have implemented 
DRM schemes that seek to curtail piracy and control how 
consumers use digital goods. In response, consumers have 
complained that these schemes bring problems of overreach,88 
intrusiveness,89 and obsolescence.90  
Some consumers express their concern that DRM inhibits fair 
use.91 The DMCA states that it is not intended to affect “defenses to 
 
 84.  17 U.S.C. § 108. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. § 107. 
 87.  See, e.g., Burke, supra note 71, at 558 (“In the United States, such 
protection would already have been provided under the doctrine of contributory 
infringement, which attributes copyright liability to providers of technical devices 
that lack a substantial noninfringing use.”); Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA 
Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 205, 210–11 (2006) (touting reasonable exemptions 
in both European and Australian implementations of the WIPO Treaty). 
 88.  E.g., Jeremy Gallman, Microsoft Kills Overreaching XBOX One DRM Policies, 
TECHTAINIAN (June 20, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://techtainian.com/news/2013/6 
/20/microsoft-kills-overreaching-xbox-one-drm-policies; Blake Snow, EA Admits to 
Overreaching DRM in Spore, Gamers Still Upset, MACWORLD (Sept. 25, 2008, 4:09 AM), 
http://www.macworld.com/article/1135733/spore.html. 
 89.  Letter from Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Comm’r of Can., to Jim Prentice, 
Minister of Indus., and Josée Verner, Minister of Canadian Heritage, Letter with 
Respect to Possible Amendments to the Copyright Act (Jan. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.priv.gc.ca/parl/2008/let_080118_e.asp (“DRM technologies can also 
collect detailed personal information from users, who often do no more than 
access the content on a computer. . . . That this occurs when individuals are 
engaged in a private activity in their homes or other places where they have a high 
expectation of privacy exacerbates the intrusiveness of the collection.”). 
 90.  See 37 CFR § 201.40 (2012) (permitting circumvention of DRM that is 
obsolete); see 30 Days of DRM—Day 17: Broken or Obsolete Technology (Circumvention 
Rights), MICHAEL GEIST (Sept. 4, 2006), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view 
/1408/195/.  
 91.  E.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[Defendants] argue that those who would make fair use of 
technologically protected [DRM] copyrighted works need means, such as DeCSS, 
of circumventing access control measures not for piracy, but to make lawful use of 
those works.”), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
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copyright infringement, including fair use”92—though at least one 
commentator has noted that “there is no such thing as a section 
107 fair use defense to a charge of a section 1201 violation.”93 
Courts have rejected the notion that fair use is a potential 
“commercially significant purpose” that would qualify as a 
circumvention measure (an exemption to § 1201).94 Essentially, 
courts have taken the position that fair use is permitted, but 
creating and disseminating technology that facilitates fair use (by 
circumventing DRM) is not. In practice, some consumers argue 
that the interplay between DRM and the DMCA allows copyright 
holders to implement technological measures that curtail 
consumers’ fair use beyond what copyright law would otherwise 
permit.95 
Consumers argue that many DRM schemes have been highly 
intrusive—especially those intended to control how users interact 
with digital media on their personal computers. For example, 
between 2005 and 2007, Sony BMG distributed millions of music 
CDs containing Extended Copy Protection (XCP).96 Although 
XCP’s ostensible purpose was preventing unauthorized uses 
(e.g., copying), XCP also curtailed valid uses (e.g., listening).97 For 
 
 92.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012). 
 93.  David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 723 (2000). 
 94.  See, e.g., Corley, 273 F.3d at 459 (“Fair use has never been held to be a 
guarantee of access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user’s 
preferred technique or in the format of the original.”); United States v. Elcom 
Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (acknowledging that the DMCA 
“impacts a lawful purchaser’s ‘right’ to make a back-up copy, or to space-shift that 
copy to another computer,” but finding that this limited impairment of a fair use 
right is not so overbroad as to render the DMCA unconstitutional). 
 95.  E.g., Pamela Samuelson, DRM {and, or, vs.} the Law, 46 COMM. ACM, Apr. 
2003, at 41, 42, available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/acm 
_v46_p41.pdf (“While DRM systems can certainly prevent illegal copying and 
public distribution of copyrighted works, they can do far more . . . , thus exceeding 
copyright’s bounds.”).  
 96.  Cf. Sony Faces Slew of Lawsuits Over Digital-Rights Software: Guevara v. Sony 
BMG Music Entm’t, 23 ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP., Dec. 1, 2005, at 
2 [hereinafter Sony Faces Slew of Lawsuits], available at 2005 WL 3197656 
(summarizing the seven DRM lawsuits filed against Sony in 2005). 
 97.  Complaint at 55, 94, Hull v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t Corp., 
No. BC343385 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2005), 2005 WL 3142873 (commencing 
one of several Electronic Frontier Foundation-sponsored cases against Sony BMG 
regarding the XCP “rootkit”). 
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example, users attempting to listen on certain computer 
configurations were unable to do so. In addition, XCP was 
sometimes installed without the user’s knowledge or permission; 
further, it contained security flaws that exposed consumers’ 
computers to malware or hacking.98 XCP’s insecurity led the 
technology community to disparagingly refer to it as “the Sony 
rootkit.”99 Notably, the only consumers adversely affected by XCP 
were those who purchased the CD legally. Illegal copies likely 
stripped the copy-protection software. 
Another perceived weakness in DRM schemes is the risk of the 
digital media container’s premature obsolescence. Many DRM 
schemes require the computer or device that plays or displays the 
digital media to “call home”—ensuring that the consumer’s 
proposed use of the media is authorized. That arrangement works 
reasonably well, so long as (1) the consumer can access the 
Internet and (2) the DRM servers remain available. In DRM’s short 
history, however, a number of companies chose to shut down the 
DRM servers when maintaining them was no longer commercially 
advantageous.100 In such cases, lawful purchasers are frequently left 
unable to access or use their digital goods.101 
All of these perceived weaknesses may make DRM an 
unpalatable option for certain content. For example, the music 
consumers who were used to freely copying music to multiple 
devices—permitted by DRM-free MP3s—became frustrated with the 
DRM-shackled services such as iTunes.102 As a result, and bolstered 
 
 98.  Sony Faces Slew of Lawsuits, supra note 96, at 2. 
 99.  Complaint, supra note 97, at 54, 61, 63, 65, 70; cf. Randal C. Picker, 
Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 47, 58 
(2006) (noting that once executed, the XCP “can block normal copying of the CD 
and can impose an end-user license agreement that limits access by the computer 
to the CD”). 
 100.  E.g., Digital Rights Management—Obsolescence, MGMT-SURVIVAL.COM 
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://management-survival.com/digital-rights-management 
-obsolescence/ (providing several examples of companies ceasing DRM support).  
 101.  For example, in 2006 Amazon ceased support for PDF and LIT format e-
Books with DRM, and users who had previously purchased books in those formats 
could no longer access the books on new devices. Digital Rights 
Management, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_rights_management 
#Obsolescence (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
 102.  Matthew Ingram, Why Apple’s iTunes Concessions Are a Double-Edged Sword, 
GIGAOM (Jan. 6, 2009, 7:05 PM), http://gigaom.com/2009/01/06/why-apples 
-itunes-concessions-are-a-double-edged-sword/ (noting Apple’s shift to DRM-free 
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by competition from MP3 stores like Amazon and eMusic, Apple 
and the music industry removed DRM from its music downloads.103 
Today, music sales are nearly universally DRM free. In contrast, 
however, e-books and movies nearly always contain DRM. To date, 
consumers have not shown the same distaste for DRM in those 
media, and brisk sales of e-books, in particular, likely encourages 
publishers to stay the DRM course. Some have argued that DRM 
keeps honest people honest—preventing devolution into piracy.104 
But if a digital first-sale doctrine develops, that may well require 
breaking DRM. 
V. HOW COULD DIGITAL FIRST SALE HAPPEN? 
A. Courts 
As with many new technological developments, the initial test 
ground for the digital first-sale doctrine has been the courts. But as 
much as consumers may want it, U.S. courts are unlikely to extend 
the first-sale doctrine to digital goods. A recent test case for digital 
first sale—involving questions of ownership, copying, and efficacy 
of technological measures—is Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc.105 
Recognizing the untapped economic potential for a secondary 
market in digital goods, ReDigi developed technology that allowed 
users to sell their copies of digital music, while striving to ensure 
that only one copy existed at a time.106 Capitol Records disagreed 
with ReDigi’s factual assertions about the technology, arguing that 
regardless of whether a “transfer” incorporated a bit-by-bit transfer 
of the original file, the process created a new copy—an act that 
 
music); Janko Roettgers, Apple’s iCloud Punishes Honest iTunes Users with DRM, 
GIGAOM (June 8, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://gigaom.com/2011/06/08/apple-icloud 
-drm/. 
 103.  See Ingram, supra note 102 (“Amazon (among others) has had DRM-free 
songs from the four major record labels available in its online store for almost a 
year now.”).  
 104.  Digital Film: Industry Answers, B.B.C. (Feb. 9, 2006), http://news.bbc.co 
.uk/2/hi/entertainment/4691232.stm (“Without the use of DRMs, honest 
consumers would have no guidelines and might eventually come to totally 
disregard copyright and therefore become a pirate, resulting in great harm to 
content creators.” (quoting Dan Glickman, Motion Picture Association of 
America)). 
 105.  934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 106.  Id. at 645–46. 
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violated Capitol’s exclusive right of reproduction.107 The Southern 
District of New York agreed with Capitol’s reasoning,108 
distinguishing the copyrighted work (the sound recording in the 
form of a digital music file) from the “material object” to which it 
was affixed (the phonorecord, or here, the hard disk’s written-to 
segment).109 Addressing concerns about the limitation to the first-
sale defense, the court contended that § 109(a) still applied to 
digital goods because the owners—at the time of purchase—could 
still sell or trade the actual device to which those digital copies were 
downloaded.110 This suggestion that consumers simply enable a 
secondary market by the selling and trading of iPods and hard 
drives has come under criticism for its impracticality.111 Given the 
Ninth Circuit’s favorable view of license terms that restrict resale112 
and the ongoing distinction between the reproduction and 
distribution rights, ReDigi faces steep odds on appeal. 
In contrast, the EU Court of Justice has held that regardless of 
parties’ contractual terms, a digital “sale” falls under the first-sale 
doctrine—so long as the license looks sufficiently like a sale.113 For 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 648 (“[T]he plain text of the Copyright Act makes clear that 
reproduction occurs when a copyrighted work is fixed in a new material object.”); 
see also id. at 650 (“[I]t is the creation of a new material object and not an additional 
material object that defines the reproduction right.”). 
 109.  Id. at 649 (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 
153, 166 & n.16, 171 (D. Mass. 2008)). 
 110.  Id. at 656 (“Section 109(a) still protects a lawful owner’s sale of her 
‘particular’ phonorecord, be it a computer hard disk, iPod, or other memory 
device onto which the file was originally downloaded.”). 
 111.  See, e.g., Mike Masnick, ReDigi Loses: You Can’t Resell Your MP3s (Unless 
You Sell Your Whole Hard Drive), TECHDIRT (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:01 PM), http:// 
www.techdirt.com/articles/20130401/11341622538/redigi-loses-selling-used-mp3s 
-online-infringes-first-sale-doesnt-apply-to-digital-transfers.shtml (calling the ruling 
“obviously nutty”). 
 112.  See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010); see also F.B.T. 
Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing 
the factors to be examined in determining if a transaction is a license: “[I]t is well 
settled that where a copyright owner transfers a copy of copyrighted material, 
retains title, limits the uses to which the material may be put, and is compensated 
periodically based on the transferee’s exploitation of the material, the transaction 
is a license.”). 
 113.  See Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012 EUR-Lex 
CELEX 62011CJ0128 (July 3, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex= 
62011CJ0128&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=. 
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example, the EU Court of Justice held that if a license lacks any 
limitations on time or ownership, then the initial owner may 
alienate ownership (through subsequent sales, gifts, etc.).114 This 
EU development adds an incentive for copyright holders and 
publishers to restrict their license terms, which will likely drive 
down prices as consumers may balk at the limited nature of the 
“sale.” That work-around may also serve as an additional reason 
that U.S. courts are unlikely to adopt a digital first-sale doctrine—
without congressional policy-weighing deliberations. 
B. Legislation 
An obvious way to create a right to digital first sale would be to 
amend § 109. In 1997, Representatives Dick Boucher (D-VA) and 
Tom Campbell (R-CA) introduced a bill that sought to do just that: 
the Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act115 (“Boucher-
Campbell”). 
The authorization for use set forth in subsection 
(a) applies where the owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord in a digital format lawfully made under this 
title, or any person authorized by such owner, performs, 
displays or distributes the work by means of transmission 
to a single recipient, if that person erases or destroys his 
or her copy or phonorecord at substantially the same 
time. The reproduction of the work, to the extent 
necessary for such performance, display, distribution, is 
not an infringement.116 
After its introduction, Boucher-Campbell did not pass; in many 
ways, it was superseded by the DMCA.117 One concern was the bill’s 
extension of the first-sale doctrine to allow for reproduction, as well 
as distribution—since digital goods cannot be transferred without 
creating a new copy.118 But more than fifteen years after Boucher-
Campbell, when so much of our media and software markets 
involve digital goods, Congress might consider modifying the 
distinction between reproduction and distribution, given that all of 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 118.  DMCA REPORT, supra note 51, at 47. 
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digital goods’ distribution also involves reproduction. Such an 
amendment would also guide courts that need to determine when 
a new digital copy is an infringing copy.119 In the digital age, the 
concept of a purchaser’s “master” copy is largely anachronistic. Just 
because a consumer originally downloads an iTunes song to a 
computer, that consumer should not be required to keep that 
particular computer forever—merely to retain the consumer’s 
rights to possess and listen to that song. 
Another way for Congress to establish a digital first-sale 
doctrine would be to regulate license agreements concerning 
copyrights. The law could create an implied right to resell or 
transfer the ownership of individual digital files, user accounts, or 
both. Such an implied right would likely mitigate the problem of 
assets being lost, upon the user’s death. 
C. Marketplace 
Although legislation or judicial decisions may be the most 
sweeping means to establish a digital first-sale doctrine, the best 
hope for a secondary market in digital goods may well be the 
marketplace. When Apple launched iTunes, its deals with record 
companies required that songs include DRM. Because iTunes’s 
introduction slowed (and potentially reversed) the record 
industry’s apparent free fall, many have viewed iTunes as the music 
industry’s savior. But after a few years, music companies became 
less enamored with Apple’s dominant position and its resultant 
effect on pricing, so the record industry diversified—permitting 
music to be sold through other services, such as Amazon, Google, 
eMusic, and others.120 To make those distribution outlets attractive 
 
 119.  See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649–50 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Because the reproduction right is necessarily implicated when a 
copyrighted work is embodied in a new material object, and because digital music 
files must be embodied in a new material object following their transfer over the 
Internet, the Court determines that the embodiment of a digital music file on a 
new hard disk is a reproduction within the meaning of the Copyright Act.”). But if 
the ReDigi rule became widespread, users could never transfer music to an iPod or 
iPhone (since that requires transfer to a “new hard disk”). And when a user’s 
computer hard drive dies, the user’s right to listen to the downloaded music would 
die with it. 
 120.  E.g., Greg Sandoval, Amazon Exec Slams Some in Music Sector, CNET 
(Apr. 11, 2010, 6:28 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20002223-261.html 
(“Whether or not Amazon’s price cutting was done with the labels’ blessing, what 
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alternatives to iTunes, the music companies permitted the other 
services to sell music without DRM—largely in unlocked MP3 
files.121 In 2009, with the digital-music distribution marketplace 
more diversified, Apple and the record companies renegotiated 
their licenses to offer Apple’s entire catalog DRM free.122 
Now, the digital marketplace’s 800-pound gorillas may be 
poised to do a similar metamorphosis for digital first sale. Apple 
has filed a patent application concerning secondary sales of digital 
goods.123 And the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has already 
granted such a patent to Amazon.124 Both companies have 
prosecuted these patents despite the current lack of any legal 
ability to resell digital goods. Of course, just because a patent is 
filed or granted does not make the underlying technology legal. 
But the filings do indicate that both companies realize that, as 
digital content’s largest distributors, they have great power to 
influence (or create) a secondary market. 
Amazon is arguably the world’s largest content distributor—
analog and digital alike—so its business choices in this sector carry 
great weight. Amazon already permits its users to lend certain 
e-books between friends,125 but the system permits such lending 
only if a publisher grants its permission. Under Amazon’s patent, 
granted in January 2013, the company has foreshadowed its 
apparent plans to expand that service. The patent claims a system 
 
is certain is that the record industry wanted another strong player in digital music 
to help counter Apple’s enormous power.”).  
 121.  Id. (“[E]ver since Amazon launched its MP3 music store in September 
2007, the labels have acted as if they appeared to favor the service. In January 
2008, Amazon became the first music store to sell tunes from the major labels free 
of digital rights management software.”). 
 122.  Dana P. Jozefczyk, Note, The Poison Fruit: Has Apple Finally Sown the Seed of 
Its Own Destruction?, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 369, 387 (2009). 
 123.  U.S. Patent Application No. 13/531,280 (filed June 22, 2012) 
(publication number 20130060616). 
 124.  U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595 (filed May 5, 2009) (issued Jan. 29, 2013). 
 125.  Marcus Wohlsen, Amazon Wants to Get into the Used E-Book Business— 
Or Bury It, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/business/2013 
/02/amazon-used-e-book-patent/ (“Currently if a publisher grants Amazon the 
rights, when a Kindle customer ‘buys’ a book, they have the option to loan the 
access rights to that digital file to friends or family that are also Kindle users. While 
the book is on loan, the original owner of the book is unable to access the e-book 
on any Kindle device. It’s still on those devices, but the access rights to the book 
have been transferred temporarily to the person with the loaned e-book.”). 
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in which each user has a personalized data store, which contains 
that user’s various purchased media.126 Users can access the media 
in their stores via moving, streaming, or downloading. When a user 
no longer wishes to access a piece of media, that user can transfer 
those media rights to another user, and the original user’s access to 
the media will be restricted or eliminated. In an apparent nod to 
copyright holders, the claimed system supports limiting how often a 
digital object can be moved or transferred, based on business rules 
(which would likely be tied to license agreements).127 These 
transfer limits apparently seek to preserve some semblance of 
scarcity inherent in physical secondary markets—mimicking the 
way that physical objects degrade over time, after passing through 
several hands. Although Amazon’s patent may hint at that 
company’s plans to establish a full-fledged digital market, some 
have speculated that the company may leverage its patent to prevent 
such a market from being established.128 For example, some have 
argued that certain functions of ReDigi’s marketplace129 may 
overlap with Amazon’s claim 1.130 
Shortly after Amazon received its patent, Apple also applied 
for a patent regarding the digital secondary market.131Apple’s 
system is similar to Amazon’s, though Apple adds a mechanism to 
revert a portion of the sale proceeds to the digital marketplace, the 
copyright holder, or both.132 This functionality is a likely ploy 
seeking copyright holders’ agreement to a secondary-market 
scheme by providing them with a cut of the fees from future sales. 
Copyright holders have justifiable concerns about the infinite reuse 
and resale of digital goods, so such residual payments would 
 
 126.  ‘595 Patent, claim 1.  
 127.  Id., claim 2. 
 128.  Wohlsen, supra note 125 (“I would not leap to the conclusion that the 
fact that they have this patent means that they intend to go into this business, . . . 
[t]hey may be patenting it to keep it off the market.”).  
 129.  See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 644–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 130.  E.g., Eriq Gardner, Amazon Gains Patent on Market for ‘Used’ Digital Movies, 
Songs, Books, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 6, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www 
.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/amazon-gains-patent-market-used-418909.  
 131.  See U.S. Patent Application No. 13/531,280 (filed June 12, 2012). 
 132.  Id. ¶ [0007] (“In some embodiments, the online store and/or the 
publisher of the digital content item may receive a portion of the proceeds of the 
transfer.”). 
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provide copyright holders with a new revenue stream. ReDigi, 
which has regrouped and is planning to begin selling used e-books 
in the near future, also supports giving artists and copyright 
holders portions of residual sales.133 
These potential services contain a common theme: rather than 
relying upon consumers’ first-sale rights or true “ownership” of the 
digital media—or an attempt to modify copyright law—the 
initiatives instead focus on negotiating with copyright holders to 
create license agreements. As such, these secondary digital 
marketplaces could exist regardless of legislation or judicial 
decisions. These initiatives could provide consumers with resale 
rights—at the cost of restricting freedom and reducing used-
content prices. The scheme under these patents could constrain 
the secondary market for digital goods—not by the items’ quality or 
availability, but by the license agreements (which would be dictated 
by the copyright holder). And if copyright holders extract a portion 
of each resale, this premium would be borne by either the seller or 
the buyer—raising the cost. Because a marketplace-driven solution 
would benefit both copyright holders and the marketplace owners 
(e.g., Amazon and Apple), a marketplace solution appears to be 
inevitable. Content owners may well work to create this 
marketplace—if only to stave off legislative or judicial action that 
could result in a system more favorable to consumers. 
VI. IS DIGITAL FIRST SALE ALREADY OBSOLETE? 
Any application of digital first sale requires some semblance of 
“ownership”: the copyright holder must make a “first sale” of a 
copy, and the recipient must “own” the copy.134 But recent 
marketplace developments have brought into question whether 
consumer “ownership” (the twentieth century’s prevailing schema) 
will become a relic. The marketplace has seen the rise of “all you 
can eat” monthly license schemes, such as those provided by Netflix 
(movies and television), Spotify (music), Pandora (music), Google 
All Access (music), and Scribd (books).135 These revenue models 
 
 133.  Chris Berdik, As Good As New: ReDigi Plans to Start Selling Used E-Books, BOS. 
MAG. (May 2013), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/article/2013/04/30 
/redigi-selling-used-e-books/. 
 134.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
 135.  E.g., SCRIBD.COM, http://www.scribd.com/subscribe (“Read [u]nlimited 
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permit copyright holders to avoid § 109—and its limitation of the 
distribution right—by unambiguously licensing, not “selling,” 
content. One might argue that under the current licenses, a digital-
content “purchase” is a misnomer; instead, it is merely a lifetime 
lease. In effect, a “buyer” merely rents for life. And through 
streaming services, such implicit rentals become explicit. 
A. The Rise of the License 
Today, sales of nearly all digital goods are subject to some form 
of license.136 Those licenses are nearly universally contracts of 
adhesion, preventing consumers from negotiating the license 
terms—which unsurprisingly tend to favor copyright holders. For 
example, the iTunes terms of service currently limit consumers to 
making copies for only personal, noncommercial use; limit the 
number of permitted devices; and limit how many times music files 
can be copied (burned) to an audio CD.137 The license agreements 
for Amazon138 and Google139 similarly restrict users’ rights—
including the right to transfer ownership. 
These license agreements are usually click-wrap agreements: 
consumers ostensibly assent by clicking an “I accept” button during 
 
[b]ooks for $8.99/month.”) (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 136.  Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright First Sale and the Over-Riding Role of 
Contract, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1311, 1321 (2011) (“[M]ost authorized 
distributions of copyrighted works occur in the context of a contract-based 
exchange.”). Nimmer also notes, “[I]t is the terms of the contract transferring the 
copy that determine whether ownership has been transferred.” Id. at 1312. 
 137.  Terms and Conditions, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.com/legal/internet 
-services/itunes/us/terms.html#SALE (last updated Sept. 18, 2013) (“Any burning 
or exporting capabilities are solely an accommodation to you and shall not 
constitute a grant, waiver, or other limitation of any rights of the copyright owners 
in any content embodied in any iTunes Product.”). 
 138.  Amazon MP3 Store: Terms of Use, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp 
/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200154280 (last updated Aug. 13, 2013) 
(“Upon payment for Music Content, we grant you a non-exclusive, non-
transferable right to use the Music Content only for your personal, non-
commercial purposes, subject to the Agreement.”). 
 139.  Google Play Terms of Service, GOOGLE PLAY (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http://play.google.com/intl/en_us/about/play-terms.html (“You may not sell, 
rent, lease, redistribute, broadcast, transmit, communicate, modify, sublicense or 
transfer or assign your rights to Products to any third party without authorization, 
including with regard to any downloads of Products that you may obtain through 
Google Play.”). 
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the download or installation process. Though some have 
questioned such agreements’ validity, courts have enforced them so 
long as consumers demonstrate their assent—through clicking or 
otherwise.140 And because these agreements operate outside of the 
Copyright Act—as the copyright holders’ right to license works—
they permit restrictions not specifically addressed by the Copyright 
Act, the DMCA, first-sale exemptions, or the fair-use doctrine.141 
What is prohibited under the Copyright Act can be permitted 
under license, and vice versa. Under click-wrap agreements, 
copyright holders are largely free to add terms not contemplated 
under the Copyright Act, and they may ostensibly require 
consumers to waive rights that they would otherwise possess under 
the first-sale and fair-use doctrines. Because most consumers 
decline to fully read (much less comprehend) their click-wrap 
licenses, many would be surprised to discover that when they click 
“Buy,” they do not become legal owners. Rather, they are essentially 
lessors renting (1) for the duration of their lives, (2) without the 
ability to sell the copies, and (3) without the ability to lend the 
copies to friends or family. In short, consumers do not “own” the 
works that they “buy.” 
B. The Rise of Subscription Services 
It may be too early to lament the dilution of digital ownership. 
Consumers are adopting a distribution method where they know 
they do not own the works: subscription services. For a monthly fee, 
those services provide nearly unlimited access to immense libraries 
of movies,142 music,143 and books144—and copyright holders do so 
 
 140.  See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that shrink-wrap licenses are enforceable, provided that the underlying 
contract is not objectionable). But see Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 
F.3d 17, 32 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that clicking on a “Download” button was not 
sufficient to designate acceptance). 
 141.  See Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that shrink-wrap license restricting reverse engineering that would have 
been allowed under DMCA exemption was valid and enforceable). 
 142.  Sage Vanden Heuvel, Fighting the First Sale Doctrine: Strategies for a 
Struggling Film Industry, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 661, 668 (2012) 
(noting that Netflix has over twenty-one million subscribers for its “Watch 
Instantly” streaming video service). 
 143.  See, e.g., Seth Ericsson, The Recorded Music Industry and the Emergence of 
Online Music Distribution: Innovation in the Absence of Copyright (Reform), 79 GEO. 
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without purporting to make a single sale. Such users do not “own” 
the content any more than a cable subscriber “owns” the movie on 
HBO. Under these services, copyright holders and service providers 
negotiate and enter license agreements145 that avoid any “sale” 
under the Copyright Act—and any trigger of its fair-use and first-
sale doctrines. Under all of these models, copyright owners do not 
provide ownership; they merely provide access. 
Software companies such as Adobe and Microsoft have also 
begun moving away from the “purchase” schema to subscriptions, 
limiting popular software packages—such as Adobe Creative Studio 
and Microsoft Office—exclusively or nearly exclusively via 
subscription models.146 
This scheme has some benefits for consumers. First, it 
mitigates the cost of amassing huge libraries of digital works—the 
era of the fabled “jukebox in the sky” has arrived. In addition, 
subscription services permit users to “sample” many different artists 
and genres without having to pay for albums or tracks to determine 
if they are to the user’s taste. Finally, subscription services can free 
users from the need to curate their music libraries. 
Arguably more important, however, are the economic benefits 
that this shift promises to copyright holders and distributers. For 
example, a subscriber base provides a steady stream of regular 
income that copyright holders can list as assets on their balance 
sheets. In addition, customers are more willing to allow themselves 
to become “locked in” to a particular subscription ecosystem than 
to a retail service. Finally, subscription services can allow publishers 
and distributors to create customers for life—since young 
subscribers cannot just buy music that they like until they are thirty 
 
WASH. L. REV. 1783, 1791 (2011) (discussing Google All Access, Rhapsody, 
Napster, Grooveshark, and Spotify). 
 144.  See, e.g., GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET 
§ 6.04 (3d ed. 2013), available at Westlaw LOTIN (discussing the Amazon Prime 
lending library model); Jenna Schnuer, We Test It: Scribd’s All-You-Can Read Digital 
Buffet, ENTREPRENEUR, http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/229666 (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2014) (discussing Scribd’s e-book service). 
 145. See generally DELTA & MATSUURA, supra note 144. (“[M]any sellers attempt 
to override established first sale doctrine principles through limitations included 
in their licenses.”). 
 146.  Hayley Tsukayama, Adobe’s Subscription Model and the Future of Software, 
WASH. POST (May 7, 2013), 2013 WLNR 11189193. 
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and then pull out of the system (having amassed all of the music 
they wished to amass). 
These services free consumers from the perceived hassles of 
building and maintaining a media library. In addition, they provide 
copyright holders with a steady stream of revenue based on actual 
usage of their digital goods. Therefore, subscription services appear 
likely to continue their popularity among copyright holders and 
consumers alike. 
C. Digital First Sale: Potentially Only Relevant for a Sliver in Time 
As consumers increasingly enjoy heavenly access to millions of 
songs from the Cloud—presciently dubbed by turn-of-the-century 
commentators as the “celestial jukebox”147—the importance of 
“owning” digital content decreases. This shift to subscription 
services may well result in “ownership” of digital content—as was 
the standard for physical copies in the twentieth century—
becoming a mere footnote in the history of copyright. 
The rise of subscription models may well make the concept of 
“owning” a copyrighted work obsolete—a relic. For copyrighted 
content distributed in the twentieth century, those physical goods 
will continue to remain covered under the existing first-sale 
doctrine. And for subscription services like Netflix, Spotify, Google 
Music All Access, and Scribd, the lack of any “sale” makes digital 
first sale a nonissue. So the only content affected by a digital first-
sale doctrine would be the ever-decreasing “sales” of downloaded 
content. And the licenses under which that content is sold may 
thwart consumers’ attempts to assert sufficient “ownership” to 
alienate their possession of content. 
If the marketplace’s scales continue to tip almost exclusively 
toward subscription services, then historians may well look back on 
the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ consumers’ obsession 
with “owning” content as a strange position, indeed. If streaming’s 
popularity continues unabated, the populace may eventually ask—
as the copyright holders in Bobbs-Merrill essentially asked—”Who 
can own a copyrighted work but the copyright holder?” Streaming 
relies on licenses, and when a consumer stops subscribing, 
 
 147.  Janelle Brown, The Jukebox Manifesto, SALON (Nov. 13, 2000, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2000/11/13/jukebox/ (popularizing the term “celestial 
jukebox”). 
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copyright holders simply turn off the spigot. No consumer could 
justifiably complain that he or she “owns” a Netflix movie or a 
Spotify song. In a world dominated by the subscription model, 
concerns of digital ownership could well fade into the ether. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Physical works and their digital counterparts are 
fundamentally different, making any direct application of § 109’s 
first-sale doctrine to digital goods less appealing. But as media is 
increasingly sold digitally, consumers’ inability to trade, lend, sell, 
or even bequeath digital works could well serve to eliminate the 
first-sale doctrine altogether. In the current marketplace, 
consumers’ appetite for digital content remains strong, so Congress 
is unlikely to intervene. Similarly, given the robust marketplace—as 
well as the sticky policy considerations for selling identical, non-
degradable digital copies—courts may well continue to be reluctant 
to reinterpret § 109. 
Given the state of the marketplace, the legal status of digital 
content could shift in one of two directions. In the first scenario, 
consumers’ inability to resell digital goods could lower their value 
and reduce prices, which would encourage distributors to create 
walled-garden resale markets that permit copyright holders and 
suppliers to extract rents from each additional sale. In the second 
scenario, consumers’ increased adoption of all-you-can-eat 
subscription services would make the concept of consumers 
“owning” content obsolete: a relic of the twentieth century. Under 
either scenario—both ostensibly governed by licenses, not the first-
sale doctrine—the concept of “digital first sale” could well fade into 
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